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COMMENT
LEGAL PLANNING FOR THE TRANSFER OF WATER
BETWEEN RIVER BASINS: A PROPOSAL FOR
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERBASIN
TRANSFER COMMISSION
The problem of water quantity in the United States is not one of.
total supply but one of supply in particular areas. Interbasin transfer
is a promising way of augmenting local supplies of good water,' but
widespread interbasin transfer is seldom accomplished in the United
States,2 and its mere planning provokes ferocious opposition.8 The
Secretary of the Interior is barred from investigating all of its pos-
sibilities,4 and river basin commissions, authorized by the Water Re-
sources Planning Act of 1965,5 may plan such transfers only within the
1 Aulenbach, Water-Our Second Most Important Natural Resource, 9 B.C. IND. g-
Coar. L. REv. 535, 548 (1968). See also WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER
RESOURcrS-SuMmARY REPORT 5-1-7 (1968); Piper, Water-Supply Stringencies-Features,
Antecedents and Obstacles to Resolution, 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 623, 633-34 (1968).
Water re-use, desalination, weather modification, and water salvage are alternatives.
2 Interbasin transfer is not completely unknown in the United States. For example,
under the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1964), the Colorado
River is the source of substantial interbasin transfer within the upper basin states. Tre-
lease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People, States and Nation,
1963 SUPREME COURT REv. 158, 163. The California State Water Plan is an example
of intrastate interbasin transfers of surplus water. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10000-12875 (West
1956). See also Warne, California Pioneers New Water Development Concepts, 2 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 248 (1962). Other intrastate transfers include the proposed "big ditch" or
Texas Basin Project (Johnson, Transbasin Diversion of Water, 43 TEXAs L. REv. 1035
(1965)) and the transmountain diversions in Colorado (see Comment, Foreign Water in
Colorado-The City's Right to Recapture and Re-Use Its Transmountain Diversion, 42
DENVER L.C.J. 116 (1965)). Interstate programs of great magnitude include the proposed
diversion of Mississippi River water to Texas (Tyler, Water Law in Terms of Planning
a Future for West Texas, 31 TEXAS B.J. 365 (1968)) and the proposed diversion of water
from northern Canada into the Western United States (Piper, supra note 1, at 634).
3 Clark, Northwest-Southwest Water Diversion-Plans and Issues, 3 WxILMErE LJ.
215, 228-30 (1965). For an early criticism of interbasin transfer, see Bruncken, The Chicago
Water Diversion, 13 MAEQ. L. REv. 191, 198 (1929).
4 F]or a period of ten years from [September 30, 1968], the Secretary shall not
undertake reconnaissance studies of any plan for the importation of water into
the Colorado River Basin from any other natural river drainage basin lying
outside the states [lying in whole or in part within the basin].
Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, § 201, 43 U.S.C. § 1511 (Supp. IV, 1969).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1962-1(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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basins of their jurisdiction.6 In effect, there is no integrated approach
to water resources management.7
The lawyer's basic role with respect to interbasin transfers is to
facilitate a project found to be politically acceptable,8 technically fea-
sible, and economically sound. This role really has two parts. One is
to overcome existing legal obstacles to a particular project.9 The other,
more far-reaching, is to create a revised or completely new system of
legal doctrines that provides a hospitable legal environment for the
proper allocation of water resources. The anticipated result should be
evaluated by asking two questions: "Does the law adequately protect
private investment?" and "Does it give sufficient consideration to the
public interest in optimum water use?"' 0
6 It appears that the practical effect of this restraint on river basin commissions is
to restrain other agencies as well, since their water plans must be channeled through the
commissions before reaching the National Water Resources Council. Johnson, supra note
2, at 1053.
T The National Water Resources Council, created by the Water Resources Planning
Act of 1965, § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1962a (Supp. IV, 1969), was intended to unite planning
efforts. Planning goals, however, are framed with reference to river basins, which may not
be the best planning units. See Forer, Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation, 75
HARV. L. Rav. 332, 389-40 (1961); H4ufschmidt, Research on Comprehensive Planning of
Water-Resource Systems, 5 NATuRAL. RasouRcas J. 223, 228-29 (1965); Johnson, supra note
2, at 1058; Trelease, supra note 2, at 166. In addition, the National Water Commission,
which is to investigate interbasin transfers, is merely a planning rather than a manage-
ment agency. National Water Commission Act § 3(a)(1), 82 Stat. 868 (1968).
8 "Political consequences attach to any proposal which would level off natural ad-
vantages under the guise of supplying the social and economic needs of areas characterized
by a natural disadvantage." Weatherford, Legal Aspects of Interregional Water Diversion,
15 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1299, 1301 (1968). While cooler heads may advocate state cooperation
and participation in planning the allocation and use of our nation's water resources
(Corker, Save the Columbia River for Posterity or What Has Posterity Done for You
Lately?, 41 WAsH. L. Rav. 888, 842 (1965); Trelease, Water Rights of Various Levels of
Government--States' Rights vs. National Powers, 19 Wyo. L.J. 189 (1965)), states often
remain so intransigent that even multi-purpose federal projects are dependent on sheer
political power for their approval (Comment, Problems in Interbasin Water Transfer,
I CALir. Wasr. L. Rxv. 136, 149 (1965)) in spite of the general restraint and evenhanded-
ness practiced by the federal government. Harnsberger, Eminent Domain and Water
Law, 48 Nm. L. Ray. 825, 452 (1969).
9 Former Secretary of the Interior Udall has stated:
Increasingly we will turn to the lawyers for implementation of plans to im-
prove the quality of the environment. Technology has opened vast possibilities
for future action-the lawyers must be prepared to find ways for taking the action.
This requires, first, a searching reexamination of existing problems and existing
solutions.
Udall, Introduction: Water Use-A Symposium, 9 B.C. IND. & Con. L. RFv. 581, 582 (1968).
10 Plager, Some Observations on the Law of Water Allocation as a Variable in
Industrial Site Location, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 678, 690. Dean Trelease puts it a bit differently
in a water law professor's credo:




EXISTING RIGHTS IN SOURCE BASIN
A. Traditional Water Law
Traditional water law presents substantial pitfalls for planners un-
aware of its ad hoc judicial and piecemeal statutory development.
Reduction of the total amount of available water in. the source basin
resulting from an interbasin transfer project may injure or even eradi-
cate individual water rights,"1 and the owners may demand compen-
sation. State law is therefore an important factor in project cost.12
and this end should be reached by means of granting private property rights in
water, secure enough to encourage development and flexible enough for economic
forces to change them to better uses, and subject to public regulation only when
private economic action does not protect the public interests.
Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regula-
tion, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1, 2 (1965).
11 Interbasin transfer may be affected by other rights in the source basin, such as
the economy of the lower portion of the basin (e.g., fisheries or business) and the public
enjoyment of recreational and scenic values. Johnson, supra note 2, at 1059; Moses, What
Happened to Multiple-Purpose Resource Development? A Plea for Reasonableness, 3
LAND & WATER L. REv. 435 (1968).
Although substantial political problems arise in allocating water between water
supply and other demands (Kasperson, Political Behavior and the Decision-Making Process
in the Allocation of Water Resources Between Recreational and Municipal Use, 9
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 176 (1969)), the demand for water for recreational purposes is
certainly increasing. Note, Fishing and Recreational Rights in Iowa Lakes and Streams,
53 IowA L. Rlv. 1322 (1968). If this demand is satisfied in the source basin by multi-
purpose interbasin transfer project works, provision must be made to control users so
as not to interfere unreasonably with the rights of others. Comment, The Tale of
Two Lakes-A New Chapter in Washington Water Law, 43 WASH. L. Rxv. 475 (1967).
The physical construction and presence of the diversion works in the source basin
may degrade the natural beauty and ecological balance of the site area, the area submerged
and its environs, and the basin as a whole downstream of the diversion. For example,
salt water intrusion resulting from reduced hydraulic force at the mouth of the basin
may affect private water rights. Gindler & Holbert, Water Salinity Problems: Approaches
to Legal and Engineering Solutions, 9 NATURAL RESOURCEs J. 329, 362 (1969).
Conservationists can present major obstacles to interbasin transfer. Clark, supra note
3, at 230-32. In addition to the increasingly popular class action, there is a growing
belief that individuals may have a constitutional right to a decent environment. See
generally Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E = MCS: Environmental Equals
Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. Rlv. 674 (1970).
12 Farnham, The Improvement and Modification of New York Water Law Within
the Framework of the Riparian System, 3 LAND & WATER L. Rxv. 377, 379-80 (1968).
Because unexpected fluctuations in project cost can be disruptive, before federal
assistance is given to some state projects, the state must determine if any private water
rights will be violated. Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act § 4(1), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1004(1) (1964); Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956, § 4, 43 U.S.C. § 422 (1964).
Finances are not the only consideration affected by water rights. If private rights
are violated (or are in danger of being violated), private parties armed with an
1970]
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Alternatively, good planning may leave those rights intact 18 and elim-
inate the need for compensation. 14 Before rights can reliably be deter-
mined, however, the substantial uncertainties existing in many state-
created systems of water rights15 must be eliminated, either through
comprehensive, up-to-date studies of water law in each state 6 or through
legislative reform.
1. Stream Water
In general, rights to the use of above-ground stream water are
determined under one of two doctrines: prior appropriation, used in
the arid and semi-arid western states, or riparian, used principally in
the humid eastern states.' 7 Each doctrine, however, has at least two
variations, and there is only general uniformity among jurisdictions ad-
hering to a given doctrine. 18 Furthermore, a number of states on the
Pacific Coast, in the Southwest, and in the Midwest have adopted both
doctrines. 19
Under the natural flow version of the riparian doctrine, the ripar-
ian owner is entitled to the continued and undiminished flow of the
stream through or past his property.20 When the flow is reduced, he is
harmed, regardless of whether he needs the water. Water subject to
these rights is among the least attractive for use in interbasin transfer,
because interbasin transfer necessarily reduces the flow of water down-
stream.
injunction may block the project. Even though the superior social value of the diversion
project over the continuance of unimpaired private rights reduces the likelihood of the
injunction's being granted, the uncertainty involved may be enough to discourage
diversion project initiation.
3 Farnham, supra note 12, at 879.
14 Waite, Beneficial Use of Water in a Riparian Jurisdiction, 1969 Wxs. L. Rav. 864,
882-83.
15 Farnham, supra note 12, at 378.
16 A good example is Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, Part I, 22 RUTrGs
L. REV. 621 (1968).
17 VI-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 28.55 (A. Casner ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited
as LAw oF PROPERTY].
18 In some states it is unclear what version of the riparian doctrine is in force.
Plager, supra note 10, at 683-84. Over thirty years ago the American Law Institute
reported:
A few courts adopt the full Natural Flow theory, while a few others
completely adhere to the Reasonable Use theory. Most courts, either not realizing
that there are two distinct theories or not fully grasping their fundamental
differences, attempt to apply both theories, with results that are not only
illogical but weirdly inconsistent at times.
REsTATEFMENT OF ToRTs, Scope Note to Topic 3, ch. 41, at 346 (1939).
19 VI-A LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.58.
20 5 R. PoWELL, REAL PROPERTY 711 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PowELL].
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The reasonable use version, on the other hand, does not guarantee
the riparian owner the full flow of the watercourse. 21 He is entitled
to use the available water, but only in a way reasonable in light of all
the circumstances, which include the amount of water available and
the social value of competing uses. An interbasin transfer would usually
be considered a use of great social value, but the definition of reason-
ableness varies with time and among jurisdictions; 22 a transfer con-
sidered reasonable at one time or in one jurisdiction may be unreason-
able later or under identical circumstances in another state. In addition,
there may be preferred uses, such as satisfying domestic requirements
or diluting effluent,2 that will always be allowed priority over inter-
basin transfers.
Under the reasonable use doctrine, since a riparian owner is not
harmed by a reduction in flow that does not interfere with his reason-
able use, interbasin transfers of surplus water appear non-actionable.
Once non-surplus water is used, however, the use must be reasonable
and may have to be on "riparian land" or within the watershed of
the stream.2 4 Although land is "riparian" if it merely touches the
stream, 25 the extent of the riparian tract26 is so limited that interbasin
transfer is effectively impossible. A watershed limitation also eliminates
interbasin transfer 27 but in some states water use is not limited to the
watershed.2 3
21 Id. 712.
22 "Among other things, reasonableness is judged upon the size of the watercourse,
general usage and custom in the locality and the fact that other riparian owners have
like right of use." W. ButBY, REAL PROPERTY 53 (3d ed. 1965) (footnote omitted). See also
5 PowEu, 712; 3 H. TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 724 (3d ed. 1939); VI-A LAiw OF PROPERTY
§ 28.57.
23 Waite, supra note 14, at 876-77.
24 J. SAx, WATER LAW, CAsEs AND COMMENTARY 113 (Prelim. ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as SAx].
25 W. BURBY, supra note 22, at 50.
26 Generally, "riparian land" includes
all land which belongs to the owner of land immediately abutting on the stream,
and not entirely separated from the latter by land belonging to another ...
It has [however] been said that land which was not within the same entry, for the
purpose of acquisition from the government, or not within the same original
survey as the land immediately bordering on the stream, could not be regarded as
riparian. And in California there are suggestions that if one who owns land
abutting on the stream subsequently acquires land abutting on such land but
not on the stream, such after acquired land is not to be regarded as riparian
land.
H. TIFFANY, supra note 22, at § 727 (footnotes omitted).
27 Murphy, A Short Course on Water Law for the Eastern United States, 1961 WASH.
U.L.Q. 93, 114.
28 See, e.g., Poire v. Serra, 106 A.2d 391 (N.H. 1954); Smith v. Stenolina Oil & Gas
Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P.2d 1002 (1946); Kasuba v. Graves, 109 Vt. 191, 194 A. 455 (1937).
1970]
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The limitations of either the natural flow or the reasonable use
versions may be avoided by prescription.2 9 An interbasin transfer that
harms riparians becomes lawful with respect to them, and only them,
after the running of the jurisdiction's statute of limitations for actions
based on the harm caused. It is apparent, however, that in addition to
countervailing political and public policy considerations where the
transferor is a governmental agency or unit, prescription is not a de-
pendable vehicle for neutralizing private rights affected by interbasin
transfer.30
These general statements of riparian rights are riddled with ex-
ceptions. For example, a few states permit use off the riparian tract if
the use is otherwise reasonable under the circumstances;3 1 the location
of the use is "simply [another] factor bearing on the over-all reason-
ableness of the use." 32 In fact, the modern view seems to deny relief to
"riparians who have no present need for the water"3 3 that is being put
to a non-riparian use. This trend appears to allow planners for inter-
basin transfer to ignore the theoretical differences in rights between
natural flow and reasonable use jurisdictions and concentrate on deter-
mination of existing uses;3 4 if the transfer will not disturb those uses,
it may be allowable.
The second approach to defining rights in stream water is the
prior appropriation doctrine. Generally, under prior appropriation
systems, one who first diverts and uses water from a stream has a con-
tinuing right to use the same amount of water under the same circum-
stances; his right is superior to the rights of subsequent appropriators.3 5
Compared with riparian rights, therefore, the appropriation rights of
individuals are determinable with relative exactness. However, an inter-
29 Johnson, supra note 2, at 1038.
30 Before the prescriptive period will begin to run, the use in interbasin transfer
must be wrongful. Waite, supra note 14, at 876. In a natural flow jurisdiction, the use is
wrongful from the beginning, since the flow of water is diminished immediately. In a
reasonable use jurisdiction, however, the interbasin transfer use does not become wrongful
until it conflicts with another riparian's use; it is therefore uncertain when or if the
prescriptive period will begin to run against any one of many potential litigants.
However, a prescriptive right offers a special advantage; because of the requirement of
unlawfulness, it is not limited to a reasonable amount of water. Id.
31 Farnham, supra note 12, at 413.
32 Waite, supra note 14, at 875.
33 Johnson, supra note 2, at 1037.
84 This trend may also establish with certainty the commencement of the prescrip-
tive period.
35 5 PowELL 735-38. The method by which an appropriative right is secured
varies among jurisdictions; in some it is sufficient to divert and use the water (e.g., CoLO.
CONsT. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6), while in others a permit must also be secured (e.g., Wyo,
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2, 41-201 (1957)).
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basin transfer based on appropriation may have no rights to water when
the flow in a stream falls to a point at which it can satisfy only the
needs of more senior appropriators. An interbasin transfer based on
riparian rights would generally get its share of the water available,
however small.
A frequent generalization is that appropriative rights are restricted
neither to use on riparian land nor to use within the watershed;3 6 in
addition, the rights are said to be freely transferable.37 Accordingly,
it is generally accepted that interbasin transfer is much easier in an
appropriation jurisdiction than in a riparian jurisdiction. Most appro-
priation systems, however, are creatures of state constitutions and
statutes and contain a multitude of exceptions to even the narrowest
generalization; 38 impediments to interbasin transfer abound. For ex-
ample, even appropriative rights are not always freely transferable 9
in a market system, 40 since a "change in or transfer of a water right
cannot injuriously affect another appropriator." 41 In addition, statutory
preferences for certain uses in some appropriation jurisdictions may
hamper interbasin transfers in times of shortages,42 and watershed pro-
tection laws create the same problems as in riparian jurisdictions. 43
Finally, administrative discretion under an appropriation system creates
uncertainty.44
36 SAx 113.
37 It is often said that riparian rights are not transferable, but in some situations
they are not necessarily unmarketable. Comment, Are Water Rights Marketable in
Wisconsin?, 1966 Wis. L. Rav. 942. Riparian rights have been marketed by at least two
techniques: (1) through contract for water power (Kimberly-Clark Co. v. Patten Paper
Co., 153 Wis. 69, 140 N.W. 1066 (1913)); and (2) through governmental grant (Green Bay
8: Miss. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U.S. 58 (1898)). In some jurisdictions con-
sumptive riparian rights may be transferable. United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp
& Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 38, 123 N.E. 200 (1913); Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 179
Okla. 499, 172 P.2d 1002 (1946).
38 For example, adjudication of water rights under the prior appropriation doctrine
breaks down into three systems: The "Colorado" (judicial decree establishing priority),
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-9-1 to -27 (1963); the "Wyoming" (appealable administrative
determination of priorities), Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-181, 41-193 (1957); and the "Oregon"
(administrative determination used in judicial proceeding), ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 541.310,
541.320 (1967).
39 Comment, Legal Impediments to Transfers of Water Rights, 7 NATURAL REsouRCEs
J. 433 (1967).
40 Ellis, Water Rights: What They Are and How They Are Created, 13 RocKy MT.
MINERAL L. INST. 451, 452 (1967).
41 Trelease, Changes and Transfers of Water Rights, 13 Roc Y MT. MINERAL L.
INST. 507, 510 (1967).
42 1 WATERS AND WATER Rirrs §§ 22.7, 54.2 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
43 SAx 122.
44 See, e.g., Ohrenschall, Legal Aspects of the Nevada Water Plan-A Case Study
of "Law in Action," 2 NATuRAL REsouRcEs LAW. 250 (1969):
1970]
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Jurisdictions that adhere to both riparian and appropriation sys-
tems 45 deserve special attention by planners, since their law involves
many uncertainties and contradictions. For example, the ability of a
riparian to hinder, by an injunction or action for damages, an inter-
basin transfer based on an appropriative right may depend on the
nature of the riparian's use.46 In these jurisdictions, however, riparian
rights do not attach to "storm and flood waters," which generally com-
prise "most or all of the water available for interbasin transfer. '47
2. Underground Water
Ground water is becoming an increasingly important national
asset.48 It is an indispensable water source for Nevada 9 and is extremely
important in southern California."0 However, although some federal
projects dealing with stream water also create new supplies of ground
water,51 extensive use of ground water without recharging of aquifers
could cause much stream water to disappear.52
The ease with which ground water can be used in interbasin
transfer is basically determined by a rigid classification system. Water
in well-defined underground streams is normally treated in the same
fashion as water in surface streams.5a But "percolating" water-sub-
terranean water not flowing in underground streams-is subject to at
least five different jurisdictional treatments,54 and planners must there-
[Nevada's] [p]ure appropriation doctrine [expressed in a permit system] imposes
no limitations on the place of use, which need not be in the watershed of
origin. The Nevada water law is silent on both the propriety of trans-basin
diversions and intra-basin water reservations, although conceivably the State
Engineer might weigh applications for such uses against the statutory standard of
public welfare or public interest.
Id. at 257-58 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
45 These states include California, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. See T. GARRITY, JR. & E. NrrzscHxa, JR.,
WATER LAw ATLAS 7 (1968).
46 Malakoff, Erosion of a Water Right, or Just a Pile of Sand?, 5 CALIF. WEST. L. REV.
44, 74 (1968).
47 Johnson, supra note 2, at 1037.
48 "More effective development and management of the Nation's groundwater poten-
tial offers considerable promise for fully utilizing our available water supply." WATER
RESouRCEs COUNCIL, supra note I, at 5-1-7.
49 Ohrenschall, supra note 44.
50 Reise, Planning for Ground Water Production, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 484 (1965).
51 Comment, Project Ground Water: Problems and Possible Solutions in Application
of the Federal Reclamation Act to a Disputed Resource, 44 WASH. L. R.v. 259 (1968).
52 Aulenbach, supra note 1, at 541.
53 A legal presumption that underground water is not in an underground stream
exists in all jurisdictions except Colorado. VI-A LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.65.
54 See generally White, Reasonable State Regulation of the Interstate Transfer of
[Vol. 55:809
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fore be alert for jurisdictional differences when considering ground
water for use in interbasin transfers.
Roughly one-quarter of American jurisdictions follow the absolute
privilege doctrine, under which the overlying landowner, absent malice
or waste, may pump as much water as he desires, regardless of injury
to his neighbors and for use on any property.55 This may be the ideal
doctrine for interbasin transfer; unless nearby streams are affected or
conservation statutes limit withdrawals,56 the only limit on the amount
of water that may be extracted is hydrological, and the water may be
used anywhere, even off the overlying land.57
Approximately one-half of American jurisdictions follow the For-
bell version of the reasonable use doctrine, which prohibits the use
of percolating water off the overlying land when that use interferes with
the right of a neighbor to use the water on his own land.8 Here,
interbasin transfer becomes more difficult, since a withdrawal will be-
come unlawful if any neighboring landowner is injured. Interbasin
transfer is not entirely precluded, however, since there is no restriction
on the place of use so long as neighbors escape harm.59
Although only a few states appear to follow the Restatement of
Torts in this area,60 its doctrine encourages interbasin transfer, since
a use off the overlying land that injures a neighbor is unlawful only if
it is unreasonable. 61 In addition, uses off the overlying land are merely
"more apt to be found unreasonable . . . than an equally extensive
use for the benefit of that land."6 2
The correlative rights doctrine, which provides that "only water
which is surplus to the reasonable requirements of the overlying land
may be used for other lands," is unique to California. 3 Interbasin trans-
fer is not ruled out here; it is merely restricted to surplus waters, as
it is in effect under the Forbell version of the reasonable use doctrine.
In many western states, percolating water as well as stream water
Percolating Water, 2 NATURAL RasouRcrs LAw. 383, 386-87 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
White].
55 5 Pow=L 725.
56 Clark, Ground Water Legislation in the Light of Experience in the Western States,
2 MONT. L. REv. 42,44 (1960).
57 See City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 385 U.S. 35
(1966).
s White 391.
59 Forbell v. City of New York, 185 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900).
60 White 39!.
61 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 860 (1939).
62 Id. § 862, Comment b, at 390 (emphasis added).
53 White 400.
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is governed by a prior appropriation system. Not all jurisdictions hav-
ing an appropriation system for surface streams extend the system to
underground water, however; some have different appropriation sys-
tems for the two types of water, and in some the appropriation system
does not extend to all ground water.64 A state that follows an appropria-
tion doctrine for surface watercourses may apply one of the previously
described doctrines to its percolating water.65 Of course, where an
appropriation doctrine applies to percolating water, the likelihood is
that the water can easily be used for interbasin transfer, although the
same limitations that can frustrate interbasin transfer of appropriable
stream water may also limit transfer of appropriable percolating water.66
64 Id. at 401.
65 1 WATmIS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 31-32.
66 The following chart lists the types of water rights in the source basin in order of
their general conduciveness to interbasin transfer.
Group I: highly conducive
Percolating Water-absolute privilege doctrine
Percolating Water-appropriation doctrines
Stream Water -appropriation doctrines
Group II: conducive
Stream Water -riparian doctrine, reasonable use version, without ri-
parian lands limitation
Percolating Water-reasonable use doctrine, restatement version
Group III: somewhat conducive
Percolating Water-reasonable use doctrine, forbell version
Percolating Water-correlative rights doctrine
Stream Water -riparian doctrine, reasonable use version
Group IV: not conducive
Stream Water -riparian doctrine, natural flow version
Interbasin transfer may threaten private rights in the receiving basin as well as in
the source basin. Comment, Foreign Water in Colorado-The City's Right to Recapture
and Re-Use Its Transmountain Diversion, 42 DENVER L.C.J. 116 (1965). For example, the
increased amounts of water may elevate high-water levels, extend the flood plain, alter
the location of river beds, or reduce the size of riparian tracts. If riparian owners have
rights in the augmented flow, the rights' existence, value, and compensability must be
determined under either the traditional local water rights law or some superimposed
system (e.g., a permit system for the incremental water in an otherwise riparian jurisdic-
tion). In addition, a system must be established to determine the allocation of the
incremental water and resolve conflicts among its users. The incremental water will affect
ecological, scenic, recreational, and economic interests in the receiving basin; any disruption
of existing rights may be enjoinable or require compensation. The resolution of these
issues is important even though the receiving basins presently may be so anxious to
acquire additional water that the questions demand little attention.
INTERBASIN TRANSFER
B. Statutory Protection of the Area of Origin
1. State Statutes
A number of states, including the largest states in the West, limit
or condition the diversion of water from its area of origin. The statutes
vary, but most substantially alter the free interbasin transferability of
unappropriated water and water that might have been freely diverted
under progressive applications of the riparian doctrine. 67 The statutes
of Nebraska, Texas, Colorado, and California are illustrative.
The Nebraska statute prohibits transbasin diversions from any
stream of the state "unless such stream exceeds in width one hun-
dred feet, in which event not more than seventy-five percent of the
regular flow shall be taken." '68 On its face, this provision allows inter-
basin transfers from Nebraska's major streams. A second provision, how-
ever, mandates that irrigators return unused water to "the stream from
which such water was taken, or to the Missouri River." 69
An early case construing the conflicting statutes denied a diversion
permit on the ground that the statute ordering return of water by irriga-
tors controlled, 7 but the latest case dealing with diversion permits
appears to retreat from this position. 1 In upholding the grant of a
permit, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that surplus water did not
have to be returned to the stream of origin. In so holding, the court
employed a broad definition of what constitutes a basin for purposes
of the statute and found both streams to be in the same watershed.
Although these cases may be reconcilable, since the court balanced
equities in each,72 the present status of Nebraska's area-of-origin law is
uncertain.
67 Dean Trelease has referred to area-of-origin statutes as "backwaters in the stream
of prior appropriation." Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin Develop-
ment, 22 IAw & CoNrrEAp. PROB. 301, 304 (1957).
68 NrB. REv. STAT. § 46-206 (1968). The limitations are apparently arbitrary, and the
statute gives no indication of how or where a stream is to be measured.
69 Id. § 46-265.
70 Osterman v. Central Neb. Pub. Power &- Irr. Dist., 181 Neb. 856, 268 N.W. 384
(1936), discussed in Hutchins & Steele, Basic Water Rights Doctrines and Their Implica-
tions for River Basin Development, 22 LAw & CoTFrrP. PROB. 276, 295-96 (1957); Yeutter,
A Legal-Ecdnomic Critique of Nebraska Watercourse Law, 44 NEB. L. REv. 11, 58-57 (1965).
71 Ainsworth Irr. Dist. v. Bejot, 170 Neb. 257, 102 N.W.2d 416 (1960).
72 Yeutter, supra note 70, at 56-57. In the newer case, the proposed diversion would
not have interfered with the lightly populated watershed of origin, whereas in the first
case the watershed of origin was a substantial farming area.
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Texas first attempted to limit transbasin diversions by a provision
in a 1913 irrigation act known as the "watershed-prejudice act": 73
It shall be unlawful.., to take or divert any of the water of
the ordinary flow... of any stream, water course, or watershed in
this State into any other natural stream, water course or watershed
... to the prejudice of any person or property situated within the
watershed from which such water is proposed to be taken or
diverted.74
Fortunately, however, the Texas Water Rights Commission, which con-
siders applications for permits to appropriate water for interbasin trans-
fer, is not bound by a literal interpretation of the "watershed-prejudice
act." Such an interpretation would prohibit a transbasin diversion
causing any prejudice to the basin of origin and would be, in effect,
an absolute prohibition of interbasin transfer.75 The Texas Supreme
Court has interpreted the Act to allow the Water Rights Commission
to determine "prejudice" only after balancing the anticipated benefits
and detriments from a proposed interbasin transfer and finding the
detriments to outweigh the benefits1 6
Full responsibility for water resources planning is vested in the
Texas Water Development Board. The enabling statute precludes the
Board from planning any transbasin diversions if it is reasonably fore-
seeable that the water will be required in the basin of origin for any
purpose during the next fifty years.7 7 The Texas Supreme Court, how-
ever, has interpreted the Act to the effect that "the prohibition of
trans-basin diversion of surface water is directed solely at the 'State
Water Plan' to be formulated by the Texas Water Development Board
and not the Water Rights Commission."73s
The Colorado Legislature, concerned primarily with the protection
of miners, provided in 1864 that no stream waters were to be diverted
from their original channel to the detriment of users along the stream.79
But in 1882, the Colorado Supreme Court held the provision ineffec-
tive, at least with respect to agricultural diversions,80 and until 1943
73 Tax. R-v. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 7589-91 (1954).
74 Id. art. 7589.
75 Johnson & Knippa, Transbasin Diversion of Water, 43 TExAs L. R.v. 1035, 1044-46
(1965).
76 City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n, 407 S.W.2d 752, 758-59 (rex. 1966).
77 TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8280-9, § 3(b) (Supp. 1969-70).
78 City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n, 407 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex. 1966).
79 Act of March 11, 1864, § 32, [1864] Colo. Laws 58.
80 The doctrine of priority of right by priority of appropriation for agriculture
is evoked, as we have seen, by the imperative necessity for artificial irrigation of
the soil. And it would be an ungenerous and inequitable rule that would deprive
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interbasin transfers in Colorado were controlled only by the doctrine
of prior appropriation. Colorado then created a series of water-con-
servancy districts, which were designed to limit diversions by protecting
prospective consumptive uses of water.1 This design has been unsuccess-
ful, since the act by its terms is limited to transfers effected by water
conservancy districts.8 2 Further, the Colorado Supreme Court has re-
affirmed its earlier preference for liberal interbasin transfers, stating
that there is no statutory or constitutional impediment to a govern-
mental unit's diverting unappropriated water to the eastern slope of
the Rockies.83 Thus it seems that Colorado's limited area-of-origin
statute is only a minor impediment to water resource planners.
California took its first major step toward coordinated development
of the state's water resources with passage of the Feigenbaum Act in
1927.84 The Act authorized the state to reserve all unappropriated water
for coordinated development of water resources, meaning substantially
that the arid areas of the south would have claim to the surplus waters
of the north. This provision was unsatisfactory to northern California
interests, and four years later their legislative pressure resulted in the
enactment of California's area-of-origin statute.8 5
While other states provide for protection of a natural unit, such
as the watershed or river basin, the California Act designates a political
unit, the county, as a protected area.8 The California Department of
Water Resources is charged with making and filing applications to
appropriate water needed for the state's water resources development.8 "
These applications are passed upon by the State Water Resources Con-
one of its benefits simply because he has . . . carried the water from one stream
over an intervening watershed and cultivated land in the valley of another.
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 449 (1882).
81 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 150-5-1 to -50 (1963). The general powers of the board of
directors of any of the water conservancy districts are limited in that any works designed
to export water from the Colorado basin and its tributaries in Colorado
shall be designed, constructed and operated in such manner that the present
appropriations of water, and in addition thereto prospective uses of water for
irrigation and other beneficial consumptive use purposes . . . within the natural
basin of the Colorado river in the state of Colorado, from which water is exported,




83 Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist., 148 Colo. 173, 202, 365 P.2d 273, 288-89 (1961).
84 Ch. 286, § 1-2, [1927] Cal. Stat. 508-10. See Weatherford, supra note 8, at 1306.
85 CAL. WATER CODE § 10505 (West Supp. 1970). For a discussion of the legislative his-
tory, see Weatherford, supra note 8, at 1308-09.
86 CAL. WAra CODE § 10505 (West Supp. 1970).
87 Id. § 10500.
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trol Board.8 In this procedure the Board is limited by the county-of-
origin statute, which provides that no applications are to be approved
that would deprive a county of any water necessary for the county's
development.8 9 California also protects the watershed of origin. The
Central Valley Project Act of 19339° prohibits the Department of Water
Resources from planning any interbasin diversions until all require-
ments of the watershed of origin are satisfied to the same extent as if
there had been no diversion.91 Both California provisions emphasize
the actual needs of the transferor area in its future development and
can be referred to as "recapture laws." 92 They create an overriding
right in the area of origin to terminate diversion if the water is reason-
ably required to supply the beneficial needs of the county or watershed
of origin.
The flexibility of both the watershed and county-of-origin statutes
was demonstrated during the passage of the bond issue statute for the
California State Water Project (Feather River Project).93 While north-
ern California interests wanted assurance of sufficient and economical
future water supplies, southern California interests demanded a guaran-
tee against future legislative actions impairing their water supply.94 To
assuage the northern interests, the provisions of the watershed-of-origin
statute were incorporated by reference in the California Water Re-
sources Development Bond Act.95 Rather than risk the possibility of
future recapture by the area of origin, the Bond Act provides for con-
struction of local water projects to ensure adequate future supplies
in the areas of origin.96 In effect, the legislature has cautioned itself that
whenever it enacts a diversion project it must provide for the area of
origin or risk failure of the project. Because of this, the California
area-of-origin provisions have not impeded the most ambitious trans-
88 Id. § 10504.
89 No priority under this part shall be released nor assignment made of any ap-
plication that will ... deprive the county in which the water covered by the ap-
plication originates of any such water necessary for the development of the county.
Id. § 10505.
90 Id. §§ 11100-855.
91 [N]o exchange of the water of any watershed or area for the water of any other
watershed or area may be made by the department unless the water requirements
of the watershed or area in which the exchange is made are first and at all times
met and satisfied to the extent that the requirements would have been met were
the exchange not made ....
Id. § 11463.
92 See Clark, supra note 3, at 250.
93 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12980-44 (West Supp. 1970).
94 See Weatherford, supra note 8, at 1311.
95 CAL. WATER CODE § 12931 (West Supp. 1970).
96 Id. §§ 12931, 12934(d)(6).
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basin diversion project undertaken by a state, and the California law
has "successfully reconciled regional differences as sharp as any which
exist in the West."9 7
Water resource planners at the state level must cope with state
area-of-origin laws,98 but those involved in developing federal govern-
ment projects are free to ignore these state protective measures, at
least in their application to federal projects involving navigable waters.
In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC99 the cooperative proposed
to divert the Cedar River into another basin for power purposes. An
Iowa statute required that any water taken from a stream for such pur-
pose be returned to the same stream, but the Supreme Court permitted
the diversion. The Court found that the project furthered a federal
objective of comprehensive natural resources development. 100
97 Hearings on H.R. 4671 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of the
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 17, at 567 (1965)
(Northcutt Ely, Special Counsel, Colorado River Board of California). The law is untested
in the interstate transbasin diversion situation. Weatherford, supra note 8, at 1327 n.147.
98 Other area-of-origin laws include the following:
IOWA CoDE § 469.5 (1966):
[With regard to the construction of any dam, a permit shall be granted] [i]f it
shall appear to the council that... any water taken from the stream in connec-
tion with the project is returned thereto at the nearest practicable place with-
out being materially diminished in quantity or polluted ....
Ajm. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 45-172(5) (Supp. 1970):
No right to the use of water on or from any watershed or drainage area
which supplies or contributes water for the irrigation of lands within an irriga-
tion district, agricultural improvement district or water users association shall
be severed or transferred without the consent of the governing body.
House Joint Res. No. 502, 26th Okla. Leg. § 2, [1957] Okla. Laws 672, incorporated by
reference in OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1078 (1970) (guidelines for the State Water Re-
sources Board):
Before an appropriated or adjudicated right may be granted for water to be
ultimately used at a distant point, sufficient reserves should be set up to take
care of the present and reasonable future needs of the area of origin.
North Dakota specifically encourages transbasin diversions. The Water Conservation Com-
mission has full authority
[t]o conserve and develop the waters within the natural watershed areas of the
state and, subject to vested rights, to divert the waters within a watershed area to
another watershed area and the waters of any river, lake or stream into another
river, lake or stream.
N.D. CENr. CODE § 61-02-14(l)(d) (Supp. 1969).
99 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
100 Id. at 180-82. See Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFFALO
.L. REv. 399, 402 (1961). In City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963), the Supreme
Court held that state law does not prevent the United States from exercising its eminent
domain power to acquire water rights of private users under the Reclamation Act of 1902,
43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616 (1964). Even though the Act directs the Secretary of the Interior to pro-
ceed'udder applicable state law (id. § 383), the Court held that the only function of state
law in an eminent domain taking is-to define the troperty interest that is to be compen-
sated. 372 US. at 630. Since it is unlikely that ard;a-of-origin statutes treate vested prop-
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2. Federal Statutes
Although state law is not binding on the federal government,
Congress may choose to recognize an established state law or policy
when creating a water resources project. An example of this is the
Frying Pan-Arkansas diversion project, which provides that the Color-
ado prohibition against west-east transbasin diversions applies to the
project.10 1 The project statute also precludes the Secretary of the Interior
from exercising the eminent domain power to acquire Frying Pan basin
water rights for use outside the basin.10 2
Congress may also enact a federal area-of-origin law. Pressure for
such a law has been most evident in the hearings and debates surround-
ing the Pacific Southwest Water Plan 03 and the Lower Colorado River
Basin Project Bill.104 (Interior Department proposals that would have
diverted northern California and Pacific Northwest surplus water to
the Southwest.) The Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968105 indi-
cates that Pacific Northwest interests have won at least a temporary
victory. The Act provides for additional comprehensive development
of the upper and lower Colorado River basin and authorizes the Secre-
tary of the Interior to investigate and develop a general plan to meet
the basin's water needs. The Act confronts the Secretary with a broad,
temporary area-of-origin limitation: until 1978 no studies may be made
for the importation of water from other river basins into the Colorado
River basin.10 Furthermore, if after the moratorium period the Secre-
erty interests, the federal government is free to ignore them. Meyers, The Colorado River,
19 STAN. L. REv. 1, 64 (1966).
101 43 U.S.C. § 616b(a) (1964). This is accomplished by incorporating operating prin-
ciples adopted by the State of Colorado, as set forth in H.R. Doc. No. 137, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3-6 (1961). Evidently, pressure from powerful congressional representatives of
Colorado's western slope was instrumental in securing this provision of the Act. See John-
son & Knippa, supra note 75, at 1042.
102 43 US.C. § 616b(d) (1964).
103 DEP'r OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON THE PACIFIC SouTmwEsr WATER PLAN (1963). The
plan looked primarily to northern California as the source of water for the Southwest.
California's objections led to the plan's abandonment and an attempt at compromise in
the Lower Colorado River Basin Project Bills. See Clark, supra note 3, at 216-23.
104 The principal Lower Colorado River Basin Project Bill was H.LR. 4671, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), which would have provided for augmentation of Colorado River
water primarily by diversion from the Pacific Northwest. Despite some area-of-origin
protective provisions, political resistance from Pacific Northwest interests was instru-
mental in delaying the project. Clark, supra note 3, at 221-30; Weatherford, supra note
8, at 1326-31.
105 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-56 (Supp. IV, 1969).
106 Provided, That for a period of ten years from the date of this Act, the Secre-
tary shall not undertake reconnaissance studies of any plan for the importation of
water into the Colorado River Basin from any other natural river drainage basin
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tary does plan for diversions from other basins, he must include provi-
sions for protection of the states and areas of origin.'07 The Act sug,
gests, however, that protection may take the form of funding local
projects to ensure an adequate water supply for transferor states and
areas. Such protection would not jeopardize a transfer project by risk-
ing ultimate recapture of water by the area of origin.
The Water Resources Planning Act of 1965108 imposes another
form of area-of-origin protection. No entity established or acting under
the Act may "study, plan, or recommend the transfer of waters between
areas under the jurisdiction of more than one river basin commis-
sion."'0 9 All recommendations are to be screened by the Water Re-
sources Council. 110 The implications of this provision for adequate plan-
ning may be great.
Whether a federal statutory regulation restricting or prohibiting
transbasin diversions to protect the area of origin might be imposed
at the expense of another region of the country is constitutionally un-
tested. On several occasions, however, the Supreme Court has expressly
rejected the argument that out-of-basin diversions should be prohibited.
In New Jersey v. New York"' the Court stated that "[t]he removal of
water to a different watershed obviously must be allowed at times un-
less States are to be deprived of the most beneficial use on formal
grounds.""12 And in Wyoming v. Colorado"83 the Court noted that
"[t]he objection ... to the proposed diversion on the ground that it is
to another wastershed [is] ... untenable.""14
Area-of-origin protection is now a recognized factor in water re-
sources planning and allocation. The interests of the potential trans-
lying outside the States of Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and those
portions of Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming which are in the natural drainage basin
of the Colorado River.
Id. § 1511.
107 In the event that the Secretary shall... plan works to import water into the
Colorado River system from sources outside the natural drainage areas of the sys-
tem, he shall make provision for adequate and equitable protection of the interests
of the States and areas of origin, including assistance from funds specified in the
Act, to the end that water supplies may be available for use in such States and
areas of origin adequate to satisfy their ultimate requirements ....
Id. J 1513.
1os 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962-62d-11 (Supp. IV, 1969).
109 Id. 9 1962-1(d).
110 Id. 9 1962a-3.
111 283 U.. 336 (1931).
112 Id. at 343.
"3s 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
114 Id. at 466.
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feror basin should not be allowed to stand in the way of a comprehen-
sive national development scheme, yet law-making bodies are obviously
not prepared to balance uses and allocate water to the highest user
without consideration of location. In light of this, and in order to
avoid recapture by the transferor basin, legislatures may need to rely
on guarantees of additional funding for new small-scale projects to
ensure adequate supply for the area of origin.
C. Anti-Export Statutes
Almost thirty percent of American jurisdictions have enacted stat-
utes prohibiting or limiting the diversion of water beyond their respec-
tive boundaries.115 These statutes do not affect interstate transfers ar-
ranged by the states or the federal government, 116 but they are a signifi-
cant restriction on transfers carried out by private parties and lesser
governmental entities. 117 As such, the statutes may be unconstitutional,
since a state may not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. 118
An anti-export statute's constitutionality depends, first, on whether
the water involved is an article of interstate commerce. If it is, only bona
fide conservation statutes "focused . . . on the realities of the hydro-
logical cycle rather than on state boundaries"" 9 should be used to
preserve state water. If the water is not an article of interstate com-
merce, an anti-export statute should be valid. Whether particular water
is an article of interstate commerce depends on whether it is an article
11 ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 393 (1958); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-1-1 (1963); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 43-1529 (1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-408 (1948); MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 89-846
(1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-233.01 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 533.515, 533.520 (1968); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 58:3-1 (1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-11-20 (1953); N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 452
(McKinney 1967); OR. R v. STAT. § 537.810 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 46-15-9 (Supp.
1968); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7477b, § 2 (Supp. 1969-70); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 90.03.300, 90.16.110, 90.16.120 (1962); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-151 (1957); id. § 41-1.4
(Supp. 1969). See generally White 383. For a severe, non-legal criticism of' anti-export
arrangements, see Keena, Can a Water Company Export Across State Lines?, 63 PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 908 (1959).
110 Even bona fide state conservation measures must fall in the face of comprehensive
federal development of natural resources. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328
U.S. 152 (1946). See the discussion of this case as well as of Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson
Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941), in Trelease, supra note 100, at 405-07.
117 See, e.g., City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 385' U.S.
35 (1966). Anti-export statutes may flatly forbid the export of water (e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 148-1-1 (1963)), make the export depend on a'legislative consent that is difficult to
obtain (e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7477b, § 2 (Supp. 1969-70)), or on thu permis-
sion of an administrative agency (e.g., N.Y. CONSEiV. LAW § 452 (McKinney 1967)), or-base
approval of the export on some reciprocal arrangement with the state into which the
water is to be exported (e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-151 (1957)).
118 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444 (1960).,
119 White 405.
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of intrastate commerce, whether it may be moved freely within the
state. 120 Accordingly, what is involved in determining the constitution-
ality of anti-export statutes is a case-by-case determination of whether
the riparian owner, appropriator, or overlying owner is free to use the
water he diverts or extracts in an unrestricted manner. Planners for in-
terbasin transfer should first look to those legal designations of water
most conducive to interbasin transfer; 121 the more the water can be
used in an unrestricted manner, the greater its conduciveness to inter-
basin transfer and the greater the likelihood that it will attain the
stature of an article of intrastate and interstate commerce.
Generally, surplus water is an article of commerce. The issue is
not settled,122 however, and substantial confusion has followed Justice
Holmes's famous dictum:
The right to receive water from a river through pipes is subject to
territorial limits by nature, and those limits may be fixed by the
State within which the river flows, even if they are made to coincide
with the state line. 23
Percolating water subject to the absolute privilege doctrine is an
article of commerce, and the Supreme Court has held that a state anti-
export statute covering such water is unconstitutional as an unreason-
able burden on interstate commerce. 2 4
Percolating water and stream water subject to various appropria-
tion doctrines are also ripe candidates for article-of-commerce status.
Such water is commonly restricted to the place of use for which it was
appropriated, but a change in the place of use may be acquired quite
easily.'2 5 Therefore, with respect to such water, anti-export statutes are
not invalid on their face, but are unconstitutional, if at all, as applied.
Only if there is no restriction as to place of use is a statute restricting
export invalid on its face.
Stream water subject to the reasonable use version of the riparian
doctrine but not to the riparian lands limitation may be an article
of commerce. Without the riparian land requirement, there is no lim-
itation on the place of use; only the character of the use is restricted.
120 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908); City of Altus v. Carr,
255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
121 See the chart setting forth general conduciveness to water transfer, note 66 supra.
122 J. SAx, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY 90 (1968); 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 42, at 321; Weatherford, supra note 8, at 1323; 9 ArIz. L. REv. 334 (1967); 47
ORE. L. REv. 228 (1968).
123 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908).
124 City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 385 US. 35 (1966).
125 See SAx 113-23.
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It follows that an anti-export statute applied to this kind of water, put
to a reasonable use, is invalid as applied.
Percolating water subject to the Restatement of Torts version of
the reasonable use doctrine also may be an article of commerce under
certain circumstances. Since uses off the overlying land are merely
"more apt" to be unreasonable and unlawful than uses on the overly-
ing land, the doctrine creates no strict prohibition against transfer. If
an out-of-state use would be reasonable if it were within the state,
though off the overlying land, the water is an article of commerce for
that specific use; an anti-export statute covering the water is unconsti-
tutional as applied.
Percolating water subject to the Forbell version of the reasonable
use doctrine is an article of commerce only if its use off the overlying
land does not harm neighboring landowners. Percolating water subject
to the correlative rights doctrine is clearly an article of commerce if it
is surplus to the needs of all the overlying owners. Stream water subject
to the reasonable use version of the riparian doctrine is an article of
commerce if its diversion does not interfere with the requirements of
other riparians. In each of these situations an anti-export statute would
be unconstitutional as applied.
Stream water subject to the natural flow version of the riparian
doctrine is clearly not an article of commerce, since, according to the
Supreme Court, it cannot under any circumstances be used lawfully off
riparian land.126 An anti-export statute would be permissible as applied
to this water.
II
ACQUISITION OF VESTED WATER RIGHTS
An ideal interbasin transfer would be accomplished with surplus
or unclaimed water; using such water would neither disturb settled
uses nor require compensation for water taken. The ideal will not
often be realized, however. With most projects, planners will have to
decide which uses in the transferee basin should be favored at the ex-
pense of which uses in the transferor basin, how vested water rights
can be acquired, and how much funding will be required to acquire
them.
A. Reallocation of Uses
Determining which uses of water are to be preferred is not a new
problem for water-scarce states. Some western states have constitutional
126 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
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or statutory provisions favoring certain uses of water and authorizing
exercise of the eminent domain power to acquire water of a lower use
to meet priority needs. 127 Other states merely list priorities, 128 but au-
thorization to use eminent domain can probably be inferred from the
preference provisions.129 Although these provisions do not refer specifi-
cally to interbasin transfer, there seems to be no reason why they could
not be used as vehicles for such transfers.8 0
Some states have established use preferences for purposes other
than condemnation; these might be used as a model for the reallocation
effected by a transfer project. For example, the legislature may have
supplied an administrative agency with guidelines for the issuance of
permits to appropriate water. 81 Another solution is to leave the deter-
mination of preferences to an administrative agency. The broad au-
thority to oversee local public and private water systems granted to the
New York Water Resources Commission, 8 2 for example, includes the
authority to supervise condemnation proceedings.1ra
The failure of some preference provisions to define their terms
creates a danger of inequitable application. The California provision,
for example, says simply that "domestic" uses are to be preferred to
127 E.g., NEB. CoNsT. art. XV, § 6:
[W]hen the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the use of all
those desiring to use the same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall
have preference over those claiming it for any other purpose, and those using the
water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the same
for manufacturing purposes. Provided, no inferior right to the use of the waters
of this state shall be acquired by a superior right without just compensation
therefor to the inferior user.
128 E.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3 (1957):
First-Water for drinking purposes for both man and beast; Second-Water for
municipal purposes; Third-Water for the use of steam engines and for general
railway use, water for culinary, laundry, bathing, refrigerating (including the
manufacture of ice), for steam and hot water heating plants, and steam power
plants; and Fourth-Industrial purposes.
A California provision is much less comprehensive and provides only that "[i]t is hereby
declared to be the established policy of this State that the use of water for domestic pur-
poses is the highest use of water and that the next highest use is for irrigation." CAL.
WATER CODE § 106 (West 1956).
129 Harnsberger, Eminent Domain and Water Law, 48 NEB. L. REV. 325, 361-62 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Harnsberger].
180 Difficulties might arise in those states that have "no change" laws, which provide
that water rights are to remain appurtenant to the land until they are no longer bene-
ficial. Many exceptions have been imposed, and it does not appear that "no change" laws
have impeded condemnation for preferred uses. See Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress
-Case Studies in the Transfer of Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. Rv. 1 (1966).
131 Johnson, Condemnation of Water Rights, 46 TEx.s L. Rxv. 1054, 1079-80 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Johnson].
132 N.Y. CONsERv. LAw §§ 404, 420-29 (McKinney 1967).
183 Great Neck Water Auth. v. Citizens Water Supply Co., 12 N.Y.2d 167, 187 NxE2d
786, 237 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1962).
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"irrigation"; the Wyoming provision prefers "municipal" uses to
"industrial" uses.134 It seems possible that under the Wyoming provi-
sion an independent industrial user's water rights might be condemned
to satisfy the needs of a municipality that supplies water to competing
industrial users.135
B. Eminent Domain
1. Direct and Inverse Condemnation
Once it is determined to acquire particular water rights, common
sense and political wisdom dictate that an attempt at negotiation and
direct purchase be the first step. When this fails, however, the planning
agency may exercise the power of eminent domain.
Eminent domain is "the power to take property for public use
without the owner's consent upon making just compensation"; 186 as
defined, it is broad enough to aid any transfer project.'37 A "public use"
has been found even where only a small group of private individuals is
benefited,138 and the term "property" has been held to include all
generally recognized forms of water rights.13 9 Determination of the
amount of compensation need not be made prior to the acquisition
so long as provision is made for payment without unreasonable delay.140
Most important with respect to water rights, difficulty in proving the
value of property does not preclude its condemnation.' 4'
The power of eminent domain may be exercised by either a state
134 Note 128 supra.
135 Johnson 1075-76.
136 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as NICHOLS]. Taking of private property for a public use under the eminent domain
power must be distinguished from general regulation of public health, safety, and morals
under the police power. When property or property's value is taken under the police
power, the owner's opportunity to share in the benefits of the action is considered adequate
compensation, and no additional compensation need be paid. Id. § 4.8. The line between
the eminent domain power and the police power is often unclear, and only a matter of
degree distinguishes one from the other. Harnsberger 343-44. It has been suggested that
compensation be required only when the government action enhances the economic value
of a government enterprise to the detriment of a private economic value. Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 39-41 (1964).
137 Condemnation of water rights may become a major factor in the reallocation of
water. Johnson 1054. In fact, eminent domain proceedings may become substitutes for
prior appropriations in western states. Gross, Condemnation of Water Rights for Preferred
Uses-A Replacement for Prior Appropriation?, 3 W=AmErm L.J. 263 (1965). See gen-
erally Johnson 1054-55.
138 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923). See also Harnsberger 329,30.
'39 2 NICHOLS §§ 5.21, 5.78-.79.




or the federal government,142 and it may be delegated. 143 It can only
be exercised under constitutional or legislative authorization,144 how-
ever, and state-by-state examination is necessary to determine if the
language of the eminent domain statute is broad enough to include
condemnation of riparian and appropriative rights. It is unclear whether
the statute must specifically mention "water" or "water rights"; at least
one state has ruled that a general grant of authority to condemn land
is sufficient to permit the taking of appurtenant water rights.'145
Property may be condemned either before or after it is taken.146
Just as acquisition by purchase seems preferable to acquisition by con-
demnation, prior condemnation seems preferable to subsequent con-
demnation. Especially when a large project is involved, however, it may
be impossible to predict precisely which water rights will be affected
and to acquire those rights in advance.
The possibility of inverse condemnation obviously gives a develop-
ment agency great flexibility in project planning, and it has played a
significant role in major government projects in the past.147 Reliance on
it complicates project funding, however, since it is difficult to estimate
142 Eminent domain is usually considered inherent in sovereignty. Id. §§ 1.13-.14.
Initially, there was some question as to whether the federal government could exer-
cise the power, but in Kohl v. United States, 91 US. 367 (1875), the right of the United
States to acquire property by eminent domain was dearly recognized. Modern federal
statutes permit immediate acquisition of title by the United States by condemnation
proceedings in state or federal courts. 40 U.S.C. §§ 257-58 (1964).
143 In the federal system, delegation usually extends only to agencies of the federal
government. At the state level, a broad grant of the power to condemn water rights is
often made to municipalities (e.g., CAL. WATR CODE § 71693 (West 1966); see Gross, supra
note 137, at 269-70), and in recent years there have been extensive grants to quasi-public
organizations, such as water storage and conservation districts (e.g., TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 7807f(9)(b) (1954)) and conservation and irrigation districts (e.g., COLO. RV.
STAT. ANN. § 89-5-13(10) (1963)). It is unclear whether permitting condemnation of water
rights by a private individual could ever constitute a "public use." Those favoring such
exercise of the power rely heavily on Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905). which held that
an individual could exercise the eminent domain power to condemn a right of way for an
irrigation canal to irrigate private land. This is apparently an isolated case, and the ques-
tion has not been decided with respect to water rights. See Gross, supra note 137, at 269-70.
144 1 NIcHors § 3-2.
145 McGhee Irr. Ditch Co. v. Hudson, 85 Tex. 587, 22 S.W. 398, affd on rehearing,
85 Tex. 591, 22 S.W. 967 (1893). See Johnson 1059.
146 Unacquired rights impaired by a project may be condemned either by a direct
condemnation proceeding or by a cross-bill in a suit against the condemnor. E.g., Canada
v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1936), aff'd on rehearing, 179 Okla. 57, 64
P.2d 700 (1937); Tax. REv. Civ. SrAT. ANN. art. 3269 (1968). See generally 6 NICHOLS § 24.81.
147 See Harnsberger 890-91.
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the damages that may have to be paid if many lawsuits are brought.
More important, the project may be dealt a serious blow if an injured
party obtains injunctive relief.
Injunctive relief is available if the potential condemnor has acted
without authority or if there is any other defect that would defeat a
regular eminent domain proceeding.148 In other cases, however, an
injunction is probably not a serious danger. In Collier v. Merced Irri-
gation District,149 the first case to deal with inverse condemnation of
water rights, a California farmer sought to enjoin infringement of his
riparian rights by a hydroelectric dam. The California Supreme Court
held that since defendant had the power of eminent domain to secure
water, it could maintain a cross-action for condemnation as in eminent
domain.150 The project was completed prior to the bringing of the
suit, and the court was reluctant to disturb an operating project so long
as the irrigation district was able to pay damages.
Dugan v. Rank,151 the principal case involving inverse condemna-
tion of water rights by the federal government, also illustrates the prob-
able unavailability of injunctive relief. As part of the California Central
Valley Reclamation Project,152 the Bureau of Reclamation unsuccess-
fully negotiated for the purchase of water rights below Friant Dam.
Even though the Bureau had not acquired the rights, the dam was con-
structed, the stream reduced to a trickle, and the rights of the uncom-
pensated riparian owners substantially destroyed. Among other relief,
the owners sought an injunction restraining Bureau of Reclamation
officials from storing and diverting the river's water. The Supreme
Court held that the diversion of the water was a partial taking of water
rights by inverse condemnation, and that, as such, it was proper and
compensable. 153 Throughout the opinion is language alluding to the
148 Johnson 1090-91.
149 213 Cal. 554, 2 P.2d 790 (1931). See also 6 NICHOLS § 24.31; Gross, supra note 137,
at 278.
150 213 Cal. at 565-66, 2 P.2d at 794.
151 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
152 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937, ch. 832, § 2, 50 Stat. 850; Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1940, ch. 895, § 2, 54 Stat. 1199; see United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S.
725 (1950).
153 A seizure of water rights need not necessarily be a physical invasion of the
land. It may occur upstream, as here. . . . Therefore, when the Government
acted here "with the purpose and effect of subordinating" the respondents' water
rights to the Project's uses "whenever it saw fit," "with the result of depriving
the owner of its profitable use [there was] the imposition of such a servitude [as]
would constitute an appropriation of property for which compensation should be
made."




undesirability of impeding a major government project once authorized
by Congress, 154 and one writer has suggested the actual basis of the
decision was that an injunction would have been contrary to the intent
of Congress.'5 5 Thus damages are probably the only relief available.
2. Valuation of Rights
Although a number of methods could be used to fix compensation
for water rights acquired by eminent domain,1 6 most valuation con-
troversies involve only two methods. The first is to value the acquired
right itself. The Nichols treatise on eminent domain disapproves this
method on the ground that it is improper to value separately assets
appurtenant to real property.157 The method Nichols approves is to
value the water right by the diminution in market value of the property
to which it is attached.
In Dugan v. Rank158 the Supreme Court adopted the Nichols rule
for valuation of riparian water rights,159 but appropriative rights are
usually valued according to the value-of-the-right rule. 60 Assuming that
both methods are viable, this difference in application is justified. An
appropriative right theoretically entitles the owner to a fixed amount of
water, and taking or using the right does not affect the rights of other
appropriators. A riparian right, on the other hand, entitles the owner
to an amount of water that varies with the flow of the stream, and tak-
ing and using the riparian right may affect the rights of many other
riparians. In theory, therefore, an appropriative right can more easily be
154 Id. at 621.
155 Harnsberger 396-97.
156 On compensation in general see 4 NicHOLS § 12.1. Besides the methods mentioned
in the text, compensation might be fixed by the value of the acquired property to the
condemning entity or by the condemnee's investment in facilities for enjoyment of his
water rights. F. TREL.E, WAaR LAw, CASES AND MATERIAs 76 (1967). California has
attempted to provide a statutory answer for valuation of water rights in condemnation
proceedings: if a person accepts a license to appropriate any rights under the water code,
his compensation upon the condemnation of those rights may not exceed the amount he
originally paid for the license. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1392, 1629.(West 1956).
157 4 Nicoms § 13.23.
158 372 US. 609 (1963).
159 "Damages in this instance are to be measured by the difference in market value
of respondents' land before and after the interference or partial taking: Id. at 624-25,
citing Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal. 554, 2 P.2d 790 (1931). Most of the claimants in
Dugan, as in Collier, were riparian owners.
160 Harnsberger 372. This distinction is not always made. In some instances market
value of riparian rights themselves has been applied when the rights have been recently
sold. Similarly, some courts in appropriation jurisdictions have ruled that an appropriator
may be entitled to the diminution in market value of the land caused by condemnation
of appurtenant water rights. E.g., Sigurd City v. State, 105 Utah 278, 142 P.2d 154 (1943).
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valued than a riparian right.161 It is not reasonable to expect the value
of an appropriative right to be reflected in the value of the appurtenant
land, since appropriated water may be diverted to lands where it may
be most advantageously used. Riparian water, on the other hand, is
commonly restricted to the appurtenant land and should affect its
value.
In practice, the value-of-the-ight rule may be unsatisfactory even
in appropriation states. Because water rights are infrequently bought
and sold,162 market value may be elusive. In addition, it is difficult
to ascertain exactly what the condemnor or purchaser is getting; mea-
surements of appropriative rights according to rate of flow, the usual
practice, are inaccurate and misleading.163 In light of these difficulties,
and the probability that the diminution-of-property-value rule will be
applied when no value can be assigned to the right itself,164 a more
realistic approach may be to apply the Nichols rule from the start in
all cases.
C. The Option Not to Compensate
1. Takings by the Federal Government
Congress may secure control over water resources under a number
of constitutional powers other than the power of eminent domain, and
by so doing may avoid the necessity of compensating the owner. The
most significant alternative powers are the proprietary power and the
navigation power 6 5
161 Valuing an unused riparian right is a particular problem. Even if the value is
presently only nominal, proof of actual value is difficult because of the need to establish
the future potential uses for all the riparians on the stream. Trelease, Coordination of
Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 24, 59 (1954).
162 Johnson 1095.
163 If all appropriative rights were measured in terms of volume, however, an im-
proved market system would result and the problem of valuation would be simplified.
Ellis, Water Transfer Problems, Law, in WATER RESEARCH 233, 238 (A. Kneese & S. Smith
eds. 1966).
164 In non-water-rights cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that where the property
has no market value at the time, other sources of valuation must be considered. See, e.g.,
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, rehearing denied, 318 U.S. 798 (1943). See Annot., 19
L. Ed. 2d 1361, 1369-71 (1968), for a discussion of Supreme Court cases dealing with the
measure of damages for condemnation of real property by the federal government. This
annotation cites no cases of the direct taking of water rights.
165 Less important than the powers mentioned in the text are the war power (U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8), the general welfare power (id.), and the treaty power (id. art. II, § 2).
The Wilson Dam, for example, was initially justified under the war power as a source
of nitrates for munitions. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). Property needed
for the national defense is usually taken by eminent domain, but the government appar-
ently may ignore the state law and take private water rights without compensation.
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a. The Proprietary Power. The property clause, 66 which gives
Congress absolute control over lands owned by the United States, is
a source of considerable power over western streams. Except for Texas,
almost all western land was at one time owned by the United States.
Upon admission to statehood, each state, as an incident of its sovereignty,
acquired the power over navigable streams, but non-navigable waters
remained under federal control.167 A series of congressional enactments,
culminating in the Desert Land Act of 1877,168 then validated vested
water rights created by local law and custom.109 This legislation did
not make a general grant to the states of federally owned water. Rather,
it served to sever the land from the water and permitted the states and
territories, in effect, to establish water law systems under which federal
ownership might be divested. 70
Since there was no actual grant of the water to the states, in an
appropriation state the United States arguably remains the owner of
all unappropriated, non-navigable waters that flow through or originate
on federal lands. 171 The most important consequence of this ownership
is the power-known as the reserved rights doctrine-to reserve lands
from the operation of state appropriation systems and immunize the
waters of these reserved lands from private appropriations. 172 Under a
riparian system the claim of the United States is more limited. Since
ownership of land adjacent to a stream gives the owner his riparian
Nevada ex rel. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958) (military may
take water required for a base without complying with state water law that might inter-
fere with management of the property in the best interest of defense). It is unclear
whether water rights might be permanently preempted under the war power. The power
of the federal government to acquire state-created water rights for the California Central
Valley Project was sustained under the general welfare power, although compensation was
required. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950). The treaty power
has not as yet played a significant role in water resources development, but under Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), a state water law permitting a use in conflict with a treaty
obligation would fall. Trelease, supra note 100, at 415. The treaty power might thus sup-
port projects on international waterways. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
166 The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
U.S. CONSr. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
167 See generally 2 WATERs AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 42, at § 102; Hanks, Peace
West of the 98th Meridian-A Solution to Federal-State Conflicts over Western Waters,
23 RuTGERs L. REv. 33, 35 (1968).
168 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
169 Id. § 661. See Hanks, supra note 167, at 38.
170 Hanks, supra note 167, at 38.
171 2 WATERs AND WATER RiGHTs, supra note 42, at § 102.1.
172 Id.
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rights, the federal claim is limited to the extent to which the United
States retains ownership of riparian lands. 173
The Pelton Dam case174 is the most important assertion of the
United States's right to exercise its proprietary power free from state
interference. In that case the land on either side of the non-navigable
Deschutes River in Oregon had been reserved by the federal govern-
ment, on one side as a power site and on the other side as an Indian
reservation. When the Federal Power Commission licensed the con-
struction of a dam across the river, Oregon objected, claiming that the
severance clause of the Desert Land Act 175 subjected all non-navigable
water to state control. The Supreme Court held the Act inapplicable,
since the lands had been reserved from operation of the Act and were
not "public lands" under state control. 176 Similarly, in Arizona v. Cal-
ifornia177 the Court held that the property and commerce clauses gave
the United States power to reserve Colorado River water for the benefit
of Indian reservations, national recreation areas, national wildlife ref-
uges, and national forests. 178
As a consequence of these cases, there are two situations in which
the federal government may store and divert water under the proprie-
tary power: first, when there are unappropriated, non-navigable waters
that arise on or flow through the federal public domain, or where the
United States is a substantial riparian owner; second, where the govern-
ment has specifically reserved lands and appurtenant waters from the
operation of state law. Such claims are substantial and they create
uncertainty of water rights in those areas that might be affected by
future federal projects.179 Where this is the case, a clarification of
conflicting claims should be an early task for planners.
b. The Navigation Power. The power of the United States to
173 Hanks, supra note 167, at 39.
174 FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
175 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
176 349 U.S. at 446-48.
177 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
178 Id. at 597-98. One writer has concluded that the Court
meant to sanction the reserved rights doctrine for all federally reserved or
withdrawn lands; that such reserved (water) rights arise with the mere reservation
or withdrawal of the land rather than the actual beneficial application of the
water; that the determinative date is the date on which the land is set aside;
that private (state law) rights in existence before the target date are superior to
the federal right and rights arising thereafter subordinate; and that the federal
water right does not depend for its creation or its exercise, on state law.
Hanks, supra note 167, at 41 (footnotes omitted).
179 Hanks, supra note 167, at 42. This problem has given rise to numerous proposals
for water settlement legislation in Congress. Id. at 42-57.
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regulate and control navigable waters is the most important basis for
federal water development projects. English law recognized public
rights to navigate and fish in navigable waters, and no individual could
acquire an interest in water detrimental to those rights. s0 The rights
were carried to colonial America, and under the commerce clause 81' the
federal government became the guardian of the public right of naviga-
tion.8 2 The Daniel Ball8 3 defined "navigable" as "navigable in fact,"
thus extending the federal navigation power to streams "susceptible
of being used" for navigation even though not so used in fact. The
navigation power also includes control over the non-navigable reaches
of navigable streams, 8 4 and even over non-navigable streams if the
navigable capacity of other streams is at stake.8 5
The navigation power may be exercised for a number of purposes.
Although the power was originally limited to protection and main-
tenance of navigation, 8 6 congressional approval of multi-purpose pro-
jects has expanded it to include flood control, power generation, and
consumptive uses. 87 Navigation is still the "constitutional touch-
stone,"'-88 but Congress can in effect use navigable waters and many
non-navigable waters for whatever purposes it wishes.8 9
The navigation power gives the federal government unlimited con-
trol over navigable waters, but the states also exercise certain power
over navigable streams'90 and often treat them the same as other waters
when granting private water rights. The status of state-created rights
in navigable waters is tenuous, since the federal government may pre-
vent the exercise of a private right that conflicts with a properly estab-
lished federal purpose. Private water rights thus suffer an infirmity,
generally phrased as the federal government's "navigation servitude." 191
Under the navigation servitude the United States may destroy pri-
vate, state-created uses without exercise of the eminent domain power
180 SAx 576.
181 U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8. See generally 2 WAaRS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 42,
at §§ 101-101.5; Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and
the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL REsouRcEs J. 1 (1963).
182 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also SAx 376.
183 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
184 United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
185 United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
186 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
187 Arizona v. California, 373 US. 546, 587 (1963).
188 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGI'TS, supra note 42, at § 101.2(B).
189 Morreale, supra note 181, at 9-12.
190 See Engelbert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAw & CoNrrnzav.




and without payment of compensation. 19 2 In United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co.,193 the Supreme Court disallowed recovery
of the money value of the rapids and falls destroyed by navigation
works. The Court held that the company had no right of property as
against the federal government in the flow of the river, despite extended
prior usage under claim of right: "Ownership of a private stream wholly
upon the lands of an individual is conceivable; but that the running
water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is
inconceivable." 94
The Supreme Court has not ruled on a taking under the naviga-
tion servitude for irrigation or for other consumptive uses. 95 Mor-
reale argues that "while there is no case subjecting irrigation water
rights to the rule of no compensation nothing on the other hand sug-
gests their compensability."' 96 Even if uncompensated takings for con-
sumptive uses are permitted, however, language in United States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co.197 suggests a limitation:
[W]e need not ponder whether, by virtue of a highly fictional navi-
gation purpose, the Government could destroy the flow of a naviga-
ble stream and carry away its water for sale to private interests
without compensation to those deprived of them. We have never
held that or anything like it .... 198
A second important result of the Gerlach decision arose from the gov-
ernment's argument that by virtue of the navigation servitude, there
was no requirement to pay for irrigation rights destroyed by a major
water control project. The Supreme Court interpreted the authorizing
legislation to find an intent that the Reclamation Act, 9 9 which requires
condemnation and compensation for all rights taken, governs the pro-
ject.200 Thus Congress apparently may elect to use less than all the power
192 [E]ven after the United States has permitted a private use to become
established as a going concern, it may destroy the use by the exercise of the fed-
eral power, and pay nothing for the loss of the concern. It need not condemn the
right, it merely exercises its easement, or imposes its servitude. There is thus
no taking of property.
Trelease, supra note 100, at 408.
193 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
194 Id. at 69.
195 SAx 376 n.40.
196 Morreale, supra note 181, at 64. In reaching this conclusion the writer notes
that the Chandler-Dunbar Court rejected the assertion of private ownership of the water
of a navigable stream. See 229 U.S. at 69.
197 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
198 Id. at 737.
199 43 U.S.C. § 421 (1964).
200 339 U.S. at 739.
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available to it and may choose to compensate the taking of state-created
rights.201
The 1963 Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California0 2 may
indicate the direction and methodology of future federal projects. Be-
fore 1963, interstate waters were allocated under the.principle of equit-
able apportionment,203 and the results were embodied in Supreme Court
decisions20 4 or interstate compacts. 20 5 But in Arizona v. California the
Court concluded that equitable: apportionment of the Colorado River
among the lower basin states was preempted by a congressional appor-
tionment in the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928.206 When "Con-
gress has so exercised its constitutional power over waters, courts have
no power to substitute their own notions of an 'equitable apportion-
ment' for the apportionment chosen by Congress." 20 7 Similarly, where
Congress has delegated the apportionment power to the executive
branch, in this case to the Secretary of the Interior, the delegate's acts
may be reviewed only on the basis of whether he has followed the
statutory standards.208
The most controversial holding of Arizona v. California is that
state law had no part in the project.L2 9 Section 5 of the Project Act
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to contract for delivery of
water with whom and on whatever terms he chose. 210 Relying on this
authorization, the Court concluded that the Secretary might allocate
water among users within a state without regard to state-created priori-
ties.211 "Where the Government, as here, has exercised this power and
201 Congress has expressly reserved the servitude in certain western states that depend
on irrigation by subordinating the use of water for navigation to "present and future
benefidal consumptive uses" of large, multi-purpose projects. Trelease, supra note 100,
at 410.
202 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
203 Equitable apportionment has generally been predicated upon priority of appro-
priation. Other *factors, including the preservation of the existing economy, have figured
in the court's apportionment of interstate waters. See generally 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 42, at "§ 182.5(A).
204 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 825 U.S. 589 (1945), discussed in Trelease, supra note 2, at
170; Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 US. 419 (1922).
205 See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10.
206 873 U.S. at 564-65.
207 Id. at 565-66.
208 Id. at 594. See Trelease, supra note 2, at 176.
209 873 US. at 586. See Trelease, supra note 2, at 183-84.
210 48 U.S.C. § 617d (1964). See Trelease, supra note 2, at 188-84.
211 878 US. at 587-88. This result moved dissenting Justice Douglas to proclaim that
the majority had granted the federal government
a power and command over water rights in the 17 Western States that it never
has had, that it always wanted, that it could never persuade Congress to grant,
and that this Court up to now has consistently refused to recognize.
Id. at 628 (dissenting opinion).
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undertaken a comprehensive project for the improvement of a great
river and for the orderly and beneficial distribution of water, there
is no room for inconsistent state laws.1212
2. Takings by the States
Each state may have its own navigation servitude, subordinate to
the federal servitude,213 with which the state may acquire water rights
without paying compensation. 214 Interest in the state servitude has
arisen only recently, 215 and many questions remain unanswered. Fur-
thermore, the state doctrines vary so widely that generalizations must
be made cautiously. It has been suggested, however, that the states fall
into three categories.216
In "traditional" or "general rule" jurisdictions, the servitude is
confined to takings plainly and directly intended to improve or control
navigation.217 Consequently, a state taking for an interbasin transfer
intended for municipal supply of effluent dilution would require com-
pensation. "Public purpose" jurisdictions, on the other hand, encourage
interbasin transfers by allowing uncompensated takings for any govern-
ment project. In such jurisdictions lower riparians need not be com-
pensated when the transfer diminishes the stream's flow; 218 in addition,
the state servitude, like the federal servitude, extends to the riparian
owner's rights of access and navigation.219 In Louisiana, the only state
212 Id. at 587.
213 Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1897). See Comment, Eminent Do-
main-Taking or Injury of Property as Grounds for Compensation-Navigational Servi-
tude, 19 CASE W. Ras. L. Rav. 1116, 1119 (1968); Comment, The State Navigation Servitude,
4 LAND & WATER L. REv. 521 (1969). A state may also be immune from having to pay
compensation under a "trusteeship" theory. Harnsberger 444.
214 Hanks, supra note 167, at 86 n.11; Comment, The State Navigation Servitude, 4
LAND & WAra L. Rav. 521 (1969).
215 The stimulus seems to have been Colberg, Inc. v. California ex rel. Dep't of Pub.
Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 420-22, 432 P.2d 3, 11-12, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409-10 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968), which may make California's servitude the broadest of all.
Comment, supra note 214.
216 For purposes of convenience and organization, the state doctrines of navigation
servitude have been categorically grouped in the following scheme: (1) the "general rule"
jurisdictions; (2) the "public purpose" jurisdictions; and (3) the Louisiana exception. See
Comment, supra note 214.
217 Harnsberger 444. For an example of a "traditional rule" jurisdiction, see State v.
Masketer, 1 Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964).
218 Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 56 Minn. 485, 58 N.W. 3
(1894).
219 Plager, Interference with the Public Right of Navigation and the Riparian
Owner's Claim of Privilege, 33 Mo. L. Rav. 608 (1968).
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ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR. INTERBASIN TRANSFERS
In theory, interbasin transfers can be intrastate or interstate in
nature. In practice, however, few transfers are purely intrastate because
of their effect, regardless of the route traveled by the water. For exam-
ple, an intrastate transfer of water from a main stream to the basin of
one of its tributaries may influence the reunited water flowing into a
downstream state; during the transfer the water quality may have been
degraded (e.g., by increased mineral content or municipal wastes)221 so
that the downstream state now receives water of poorer quality than it
did in the past. Similarly, an intrastate, interbasin transfer affects water
quantity.
For those few transfers that are totally intrastate the task of estab-
lishing an institutional basis for interbasin transfer should be relatively
simple; a commission or a quasi-public corporation could study and
plan interbasin transfers. 222
Interstate transfers are another matter; an effective institutional
arrangement is lacking.223 At present, most interstate transfers result
either from activities of federal agencies or from interstate compacts.
These arrangements are deficient in that the enabling legislation estab-
lishing federal agencies, the planning activities of established agencies,
and the negotiations for interstate compacts fail to include directly one
very necessary party-the general public. Furthermore, leaving the fu-
220 See Wolf v. Hurley, 46 F.2d 515 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 283 U.S. 801
(1931). See also Wolfe, The Appropriation of Property for Levees: A Louisiana Study in
Taking Without Just Compensation, 40 TUL. L. lxv. 233 (1966); Comment, supra note
214, at 534.
221 E.g., Oils & Sprecher, Legal Aspects of Lake Diversion, 51 Nw. U.L. Rv. 653, 661
(1957).
222 For examples of quasi-municipal corporations being used in intrastate interbasin
transfer, see Comment, Constitutionality of Colorado Statutes Providing for Transmountain
Water Diversions, 25 Rocsy Mr. L. lxv. 363, 365 (1953).
223 Any proposed organization for water resources development must accommodate a
myriad of factors. Fox & Craine, Organizational Arrangements for Water Development,
2 NATURAL RsOURCFS J. 1 (1962). Some have argued that such an organization should
be fully integrated (Haber, Arizona v. California-A Brief Review, 4 NAru Rz souRcrs
J. 17, 25 (1964)), while others argue that it should not be (Ostrom, The Water Economy
and its Organization, 2 NATuRAL REsouxcms J. 55, 72 (1962)). Some suggest that it should be
self-regulating. Fox, New Horizons in Water Resources Administration, 25 PuB. ADmiN.
Rav. 61, 66 (1965).
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ture of interbasin transfers to state cooperation may be equivalent to
inaction.224 The federal government is the lowest level of government
capable of solving most water problems, 225 but the only suitable existing
agencies, the Water Resources Planning Act's river basin planning com-
missions, are forbidden to plan interbasin transfers.226 Therefore, a new
federal agency is required: the Interbasin Transfer Planning Commis-
sion (IBTPC), reporting to the National Water Resources Council.
Initially, IBTPC should identify each basin's surplus waters227 avail-
able for interbasin transfer. It is difficult to define the term "surplus,"
other than to say that it is relative to the needs228 of present and foresee-
able water uses in the source basin. Consumptive uses of water can be
measured quantitatively,2 29 but planners must also pay special attention
to non-consumptive uses in the basin, such as power generation, pollu-
tion abatement, navigation, recreation, fish and wildlife protection, and
scenic and aesthetic uses.
IBTPC should first ask river basin commissions to identify this
available water, but if a basin lacks a commission or if a commission
refuses to cooperate, the IBTPC itself should make the determina-
tions.230 IBTPC hearing boards, made up of individuals conversant
with both regional and national water problems, should hold public
hearings to consider the positions of all interest groups in each source
basin.
Since the economic development of the source basin depends on
future uses, the investigation may spur local interests to exhibit sudden
new enthusiasm for water-related projects. The number of spurious
local claims of intended future development could be significantly
reduced by requiring detailed plans and financing arrangements to
224 Consider the tortured history of the compact negotiations between the lower
basin states of the Colorado River, which led to several suits in the Supreme Court in
efforts to have the Court divide the water. See Clyde, The Colorado River Decision-1963,
8 UTAH L. REV. 299, 303 (1964).
225 Carver, A Federal Policy for Development of Western Water, 14 RocKy MT.
MINERAL L. INsr. 473, 485 (1968); Forer, Water Supply: Suggested Federal Regulation,
75 HARv. L. REv. 332 (1961). But see Stone, Interstate Water Compacts, 24 RoCKY AIT. L.
REv. 141, 150-53 (1951).
226 42 U.S.C. § 1962-1(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
227 The proposals for the northwest-southwest diversion all were based on surplus
water (J. SAx, supra note 122, at 77), and' the California intrastate transfers all dealt -with
surplus waters (Weatherford, supra .note 8, at 1306).
228 Weatherford, supra note 8, at 1341.
229 Blaney & Criddle, Determining Water Requirements for Settling Water Disputes, 4
NATURAL RFsOU CEs J. 29, 30 (1964).
230 This provision should encourage cooperation by existing commissions and
stimulate the creation of new ones.
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be presented to the hearing board, and, if the project is found to be
in the national interest, initiation within a reasonable period. To the
extent they serve bona fide local needs, however, local projects should
be encouraged. A serious defect in contemporary resource administra-
tion is the frequent lack of local initiative in planning for the optimum
use of water.
The hearing board or river basin planning commission for each
basin should submit a report to the IBTPC containing a hydrological
description of the total amount of water in the basin, present uses of
that water, amounts of water not currently used, proposed future uses
of unused water described in terms of their expected benefit to the
source basin, and any resulting surplus or shortage of water. The
IBTPC must then determine which of the proposed future uses are in'
the national interest.231 Those that are not should be excluded from
the determination of shortage or surplus in each basin.
The IBTPC should also hold public hearings before deciding
which demands should be satisfied with available surpluses. The neces-
sary interbasin transfers should then be listed in order of priority, com-
prising the Tentative National Master Plan for Interbasin Transfer.
After approval or modification by the National Water Resources Coun-
cil, the Plan should be forwarded to the President for inclusion in his
legislative program. Adoption of the Plan by Congress should result in
the termination of the IBTPC and the creation of the Interbasin Trans-
fer Commission (IBTC) to implement the Plan 23 2 and 'to operate a
basically intergovernmental appropriation system.
First, IBTC must provide 'for the precise determination and per-
fection of present private uses. Except in states having- permit-based
appropriation systems, existing private uses should be recorded; if the
state is unwilling to provide recording facilities, a federal facility must
be created. Recording of present uses will protect the user only
against later diminution of his use's value by IBTC projects. State water
law will continue to apply to resolve confficts between users and to
value or define private uses, and the state adjudicatory system for water
rights will retain jurisdiction over user litigation. Continuation of the
233. Standards may be defined, by the legislation creating the IBTPC.
232. The organization and structure of a water allocation system will "require serious
deliberation," so as to avoid the lack of enforcement powers found in most interstate
compacts, leave strong control in- the federal government, and provide for as much
participation as possible by the states.- Hart, Creative Federalism: Recent Trends in
Regional Water Resources Planning and Development, 39 U. CoLo. L. REv. 29, 44-45
(1966). In, implementing the Plan, IBTO must be ready to constantly revise the Plan to
adjust for more accurate determinations of previous estimates of acceptable future uses,
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state-created system of water rights should protect private investments
made under that system from any uncertainty resulting from IBTC
projects. Perfection will also create greater certainty of water rights in
jurisdictions in which a user is entitled to merely a reasonable amount
of water; he will not be forced to share the water he normally uses with
an IBTC project.
Although federal control over surplus water will be absolute, ap-
propriate state and local agencies should continue to manage both
present public uses of water and those future non-federal projects ap-
proved by the Master Plan. During the period preceding federal inter-
basin transfer of surplus water, the IBTC may transfer control of those
waters to the non-federal agencies. Likewise, if surplus water is not
subject to federal interbasin transfer under the Master Plan, the IBTC
may transfer control to the non-federal agencies for an appropriate
period or until Congress chooses to amend the Master Plan.
The integrated approach of IBTPC/IBTC233 is a necessary com-
promise. Absolute national control may be constitutionally possible,234
but it is probably politically unfeasible. Strict state or sectional control,
on the other hand, has led to poor water resources management and
failed to produce an effective market system for water rights.28 5 The pro-
posal would preserve private rights through perfection and allow the
233 The most attractive constitutional basis for IBTPC/IBTC is probably a combina-
tion of the navigation servitude and the general welfare power, which reaches all
non-navigable waters. Haber, supra note 223, at 24. Takings under the general welfare
power require compensation, but takings under the navigation servitude do not. See
text at notes 192-94 supra. If projects controlled by the IBTC deal only with surplus
water, there should be no taking of private rights. If a taking does occur, however, com-
pensation should be made regardless of the basis for the taking. Use of the navigation
"servitude to take property for public welfare ends would be an abuse of power"
(Harnsberger 452), and compensating takings of private rights is clearly in the national
interest or at least good politics. Trelease, supra note 8, at 202.
234 For a discussion of the constitutional powers under which national control
might be established, see text at notes 165-220 supra. The Supreme Court "steadfastly
adheres to the view that the decision-making power in water resource allocation should be
an exclusive federal function, regardless of what Congress says." Meyers, supra note 100, at
61. In addition, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the states can assert few if any
water rights against the federal government (Goldberg, Interposition-Wild West Water
Style, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1964)), although "[s]everal attempts have been made [by
members of Congress] to force the federal government to recognize state water law."
Comment, supra note 8, at 146. For a partial list of federal bills "purporting to 'settle' or
'clarify' the federal-state relationship in western waters," none of which have come to a
vote, see Hanks, supra note 167, at 83 n.2. See also Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over
Western Water-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RuromRs L. Rxv.
423 (1966).
235 Millman, Economic Considerations for the Design of Water Institutions, 25 PUB.
ADMiN. Rav. 284, 285 (1965).
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states to control enough water to satisfy their needs. But it would also
facilitate control over excess water, and "[t]he power to control water
uses by denying permission to start them" is the essential ingredient in
water resources planning.23 6
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